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Abstract—A novel unified Bayesian framework for network
detection is developed, under which a detection algorithm is
derived based on random walks on graphs. The algorithm detects
threat networks using partial observations of their activity, and
is proved to be optimum in the Neyman-Pearson sense. The
algorithm is defined by a graph, at least one observation, and a
diffusion model for threat. A link to well-known spectral detection
methods is provided, and the equivalence of the random walk
and harmonic solutions to the Bayesian formulation is proven.
A general diffusion model is introduced that utilizes spatio-
temporal relationships between vertices, and is used for a specific
space-time formulation that leads to significant performance im-
provements on coordinated covert networks. This performance is
demonstrated using a new hybrid mixed-membership blockmodel
introduced to simulate random covert networks with realistic
properties.
Index Terms—Network detection, optimal detection, maxi-
mum likelihood detection, community detection, network theory
(graphs), graph theory, diffusion on graphs, random walks on
graphs, dynamic network models, Bayesian methods, harmonic
analysis, eigenvector centrality, Laplace equations.
I. INTRODUCTION
NETWORK detection is the objective in many diversegraph analytic applications, ranging from graph parti-
tioning, mesh segmentation, manifold learning, community
detection [44], network anomaly detection [10], [30], and
the discovery of clandestine networks [32], [43], [52], [56],
[70]. A new Bayesian approach to network detection is de-
veloped and analyzed in this paper, with specific application
to detecting small, covert networks embedded within much
larger background networks. The novel approach is based on
a Bayesian probabilistic framework where the probability of
threat is derived from an observation model and an a priori
threat diffusion model. Specifically, observed threats from one
or more vertices are propagated through the graph using a
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model based on random walks represented as Markov chains
with absorbing states. The resulting network detection algo-
rithm is proved to be optimum in the Neyman–Pearson sense
of maximizing the probability of detection at a fixed false
alarm probability. In the specific case of space-time graphs
with time-stamped edges, a model for threat diffusion yields
the new space-time threat propagation algorithm, which is
shown to be an optimal detector for covert networks with
coordinated activity.
Network detectors are analyzed using both a stochastic
framework of random walks on the graph and a probabilistic
framework. The two frameworks are shown to be equivalent,
providing an original, unified approach for Bayesian network
detection. Performance for a variety of Bayesian network de-
tection algorithms is shown with both a stochastic blockmodel
and a new hybrid mixed-membership blockmodel (HMMB)
introduced to simulate random covert networks with realistic
properties.
Using insights from algebraic graph theory, the connection
between this unified framework and other spectral-based net-
work detection methods [18], [22], [44] is shown, and the
two approaches are contrasted by comparing their different
optimality criteria based on detection probability and subgraph
connectivity properties. The random walk framework provides
a connection with many other well-known graph analytic
methods that may also be posed in this context [7], [11],
[15], [34], [46], [54], [62]. In contrast to other research on
network detection, rather than using a sensor network to detect
signals [3], [13], [30], the signal of interest in this paper is the
network. In this sense the paper is also related to work on so-
called manifold learning methods [8], [10], [16], although the
network to be detected is a subgraph of an existing network,
and therefore the methods described here belong to a class
of network anomaly detection [10] as well as maximum-
likelihood methods for network detection [21].
Threat network discovery is predicated on the existence of
observations of network relationships. Detection of network
communities is most likely to be effective if the communities
exhibit high levels of connection activity. The covert networks
of interest in this paper exist to accomplish nefarious, illegal,
or terrorism goals, while “hiding in plain sight” [70]. Covert
networks necessarily adopt operational procedures to remain
hidden and robustly adapt to losses of parts of the network [9],
[52], [61], [66].
This paper’s major contributions are organized into a de-
scription of the novel approach to Bayesian network detection
in Section III, and showing and comparing detection perfor-
mance using simulations of realistic networks in Section IV.
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Fundamental new results are established in Theorems 1–3,
which prove a maximum principal for threat propagation,
provide a nonnegative basis for the principal invariant sub-
space, and prove the equivalence between the probabilistic
and stochastic realization approaches of threat propagation.
The Neyman–Pearson optimality of threat propagation is es-
tablished in Theorem 4.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Notation
A graph G = (V,E) is defined by two sets, the vertices
V , and the edges E ⊂ [V ]2, in which [V ]2 denotes the
set of 2-element subsets of V [17]. For example, the sets
V = { 1, 2, 3 }, E = { {1, 2}, {2, 3}} describe a simple
graph with undirected edges between vertices 1 and 2, and 2
and 3: 1 −− 2 −− 3 . The order and size of G are defined
to be #V and #E, respectively. A subgraph G′ ⊆ G is a
graph (V ′, E′) with V ′ ⊆ V and E′ ⊆ E. If E′ contains all
edges in E with both endpoints in V ′, then G′ = G[V ′] is the
induced subgraph of V ′. The adjacency matrix A = A(G)
of G is the {0, 1}-matrix with aij = 1 iff { i, j } ∈ E. In
the example, A =
(
0 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 0
)
. The adjacency matrix of simple
or undirected graphs is necessarily symmetric. The degree
matrix D = Diag(A·1) is the diagonal matrix of the vector
of degrees of all vertices, where 1 = (1, . . . , 1)T is the vector
of all ones. The neighborhood N(u) =
{
v : {u, v} ∈ E }
of a vertex u ∈ V is the set of vertices adjacent to u, or
equivalently, the set of nonzero elements in the u-th row of A.
The vertex space V (G) of G is the vector space of functions
f : V → {0, 1}.
A directed graph Gσ is defined by an orientation map
σ : [V ]2 → V × V (the ordered Cartesian product of V
with itself) in which the first and second coordinates are
called the initial and terminal vertices, respectively. A strongly
connected graph is a connected graph for which a directed
path exists between any two vertices. The incidence matrix
B = B(Gσ) of Gσ is the (0,±1)-matrix of size #V -by-#E
with Bie = ±1, if i is an terminal/initial vertex of σ(e), and
0 otherwise. For example, the directed graph 1 ←− 2 −→ 3
has incidence matrix B =
(
1 0−1 −1
0 1
)
. The unnormalized
Laplacian matrix or Kirchhoff matrix Q of a graph, the
(normalized) Laplacian matrix L, and the generalized or
asymmetric Laplacian matrix Ł are, respectively,
Q = BBT = D−A, (1)
L = D−1/2QD−1/2 = I−D−1/2AD−1/2, (2)
Ł = D−1/2LD1/2 = D−1Q = I−D−1A. (3)
In the example, Ł is immediately recognized as a discretization
of the second derivative −d2/dx2, i.e. the negative of the
1-d Laplacian operator ∆ = ∂2/∂x2 + ∂2/∂y2 + · · · that
appears in physical applications. The connection between the
Laplacian matrices and physical applications is made through
Green’s first identity, a link that explains many theoretical and
performance advantages of the normalized Laplacian over the
Kirchhoff matrix across applications [14], [64], [67], [68].
Solutions to Laplace’s equation on a graph are directly
connected to random walks or discrete Markov chains on the
vertices of the graph, which provide stochastic realizations for
harmonic problems. A (right) stochastic matrix T of a graph
is a nonnegative matrix such that T1 = 1. This represents
a state transition matrix of a random walk on the graph
with transition probability tij of jumping from vertex vi
to vertex vj . The Perron–Frobenius theorem guarantees if
T is irreducible (i.e. G is strongly connected) then there
exists a stationary probability distribution pv on V such that
pTT = pT [26], [28]. Random walk realizations can be used
to describe the solution to harmonic boundary value problems,
e.g. equilibrium thermodynamics [47], [51], in which given
values are proscribed at specific “boundary” vertices.
B. Network Detection
Network detection is a special class of the more general
graph partitioning (GP) problem in which the binary decision
of membership or non-membership for each graph vertex must
be determined. Indeed, the network detection problem for a
graph G of order N results in a 2N -ary multiple hypothesis test
over the vertex space V (G), and, when detection optimality is
considered, an optimal test involves partitioning the measure-
ment space into 2N regions yielding a maximum probability
of detection (PD). This NP-hard combinatoric problem is
computationally and analytically intractable. In general, net-
work detection methods invoke various relaxation approaches
to avoid the NP-hard network detection problem. The new
Bayesian threat propagation approach taken in this paper is to
greatly simplify the general 2N -ary multiple hypothesis test
by applying the random walk model and treating it as N
independent binary hypothesis tests. This approach is related to
existing network detection methods by posing an optimization
problem on the graph—e.g. threat propagation maximizes
PD—and through solutions to Laplace’s equation on graphs.
Because many network detection algorithms involve such
solutions, a key fact is that the constant vector 1 = (1, . . . , 1)T
is in the kernel of the Laplacian,
Q1 = 0; Ł1 = 0. (4)
This constant solution does not distinguish between vertices
at all, a deficiency that may be resolved in a variety of ways.
Efficient graph partitioning algorithms and analysis ap-
peared in the 1970s with Donath and Hoffman’s eigenvalue-
based bounds for graph partitioning [18] and Fiedler’s con-
nectivity analysis and graph partitioning algorithm [22] which
established the connection between a graph’s algebraic prop-
erties and the spectrum of its Kirchhoff Laplacian ma-
trix Q = D−A [Eq. (1)]. Spectral methods solve the graph
partitioning problem by optimizing various subgraph connec-
tivity properties. Similarly, the threat propagation algorithm
developed here in Section III optimizes the probability of
detecting a subgraph for a specific Bayesian model. Though
the optimality criteria for spectral methods and threat prop-
agation are different, all these network detection methods
must address the fundamental problem of avoiding the trivial
solution of constant harmonic functions on graphs. Threat
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propagation avoids this problem by using observation vertices
and a priori probability of threat diffusion (Section III-A).
Spectral methods take a complementary approach to avoid
this problem by using an alternate optimization criterion that
depends upon the network’s topology.
The cut size of a subgraph—the number of edges necessary
to remove to separate the subgraph from the graph—is quan-
tified by the quadratic form sTQs, where s = (±1, . . . ,±1)T
is a ±1-vector who entries are determined by subgraph mem-
bership [50]. Minimizing this quadratic form over s, whose
solution is an eigenvalue problem for the graph Laplacian,
provides a network detection algorithm based on the model
of minimal cut size. However, there is a paradox in the appli-
cation of spectral methods to network detection: the smallest
eigenvalue of the graph Laplacian λ0(Q) = 0 corresponds to
the eigenvector 1 constant over all vertices, which fails to
discriminate between subgraphs. Intuitively this degenerate
constant solution makes sense because the two subgraphs with
minimal (zero) subgraph cut size are the entire graph itself
(s ≡ 1), or the null graph (s ≡ −1). This property manifests
itself in many well-known results from complex analysis, such
as the maximum principle.
Fiedler showed that if rather the eigenvector ξ1 correspond-
ing to the second smallest eigenvalue λ1(Q) of Q is used
(many authors write λ1 = 0 and λ2 rather than the zero offset
indexing λ0 = 0 and λ1 used here), then for every nonpositive
constant c ≤ 0, the subgraph whose vertices are defined by
the threshold ξ1 ≥ c is necessarily connected. This algorithm
is called spectral detection. Given a graph G, the number
λ1(Q) is called the Fiedler value of G, and the corresponding
eigenvector ξ1(Q) is called the Fiedler vector. Completely
analogous with comparison theorems in Riemannian geometry
that relate topological properties of manifolds to algebraic
properties of the Laplacian, many graph topological properties
are tied to its Laplacian. For example, the graph’s diameter D
and the minimum degree dmin provide lower and upper
bounds for the Fiedler value λ1(Q): 4/(nD) ≤ λ1(Q) ≤
n/(n− 1)·dmin [41]. This inequality explains why the Fiedler
value is also called the algebraic connectivity: the greater the
Fiedler value, the smaller the graph diameter, implying greater
graph connectivity. If the normalized Laplacian L of Eq. (2)
is used, the corresponding inequality involving the generalized
eigenvalue λ1(L) = λ1(Q,D) involves the graph’s diame-
ter D and volume V : 1/(DV ) ≤ λ1(L) ≤ n/(n− 1) [14].
Because in practice spectral detection with its implicit as-
sumption of minimizing the cut size oftentimes does not detect
intuitively appealing subgraphs, Newman introduced the alter-
nate criterion of subgraph “modularity” for subgraph detec-
tion [44]. Rather than minimize the cut size, Newman proposes
to maximize the subgraph connectivity relative to background
graph connectivity, which yields the quadratic maximization
problem maxs sTMs, where M = A− V −1ddT is New-
man’s modularity matrix, A is the adjacency matrix, (d)i = di
is the degree vector, and V = 1Td is the graph volume [44].
Newman’s modularity-based graph partitioning algorithm, also
called community detection, involves thresholding the values
of the principal eigenvector of M. Miller et al. [38]–[40] also
consider thresholding arbitrary eigenvectors of the modularity
matrix, which by the Courant minimax principle biases the
Newman community detection algorithm to smaller subgraphs,
a desirable property for many applications. They also outline
an approach for exploiting observations within the spectral
framework [38].
Other graph partitioning methods invoke alternate relaxation
approaches that yield practical detection/partitioning algo-
rithms such as semidefinite programming (SDP) [6], [35], [69].
A class of graph partitioning algorithms is based on infinite
random walks on graphs [59]. Zhou and Lipowsky define
proximity using the average distance between vertices [72].
Anderson et al. define a local version biased towards spe-
cific vertices [4]. Mahoney et al. develop a local spectral
partitioning method by augmenting the quadratic optimization
problem with a locality constraint and relaxing to a convex
SDP [37]. An important dual to network detection is the
problem of identifying the source of an epidemic or rumor
using observations on the graph [53], [54]. Another related
problem is the determination of graph topologies for which
epidemic spreading occurs [11], [62]. The approach adopted in
this paper has fundamentally different objectives and propaga-
tion models than the closely-related epidemiological problems.
These problems focus on disease spreading to large portions of
the entire graph, which arises because disease may spread from
any infected neighbor—yielding a logical OR of neighborhood
disease. Network detection focuses on discovering a subgraph
most likely associated with a set of observed vertices, assum-
ing random walk propagation to the observations—yielding an
arithmetic mean of neighborhood threat. All of these methods
are related to spectral partitioning through the graph Laplacian.
III. BAYESIAN NETWORK DETECTION
The Bayesian model developed here depends upon threat
observation and propagation via random walks over both space
and time, and the underlying probabilistic models that govern
inference from observation to threat, then propagation of threat
throughout the graph. Bayes’ rule is used to develop a network
detection approach for spatial-only, space-time, and hybrid
graphs. The framework assumes a given Markov chain model
for transition probabilities, and hence knowledge of the graph,
and a diffusion model for threat. Neyman–Pearson optimality
is developed in the context of network detection with a simple
binary hypothesis, and it is proved that threat propagation is
optimum in this sense.
The framework is sufficiently general to capture graphs
formed by many possible relationships between entities, from
simple graphs with vertices that represent a single type of
entity, to bipartite or multipartite graphs with heterogeneous
entities. For example, an email network is a bipartite graph
comprised of two types of vertices: individual people and in-
dividual email messages, with edges representing a connection
between people and messages. Without loss of generality, all
entity types to be detected are represented as vertices in the
graph, and their connections are represented by edges weighted
by scalar transition probabilities.
Network detection is the problem of identifying a specific
subgraph within a given graph G = (V,E). Assume that
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within G, a foreground or “threat” network V Θ exists defined
by an (unknown) binary random variable:
Definition 1 Threat is a {0, 1}-valued discrete random vari-
able. Threat on a graph G = (V,E) is a {0, 1}-valued function
Θ ∈ V (G). Threat at the vertex v is denoted Θv . A vertex
v ∈ V is in the foreground if Θv = 1, otherwise v is in the
background.
The foreground or threat vertices are the set V Θ = { v :
Θv = 1}, and the foreground or threat network is the induced
subgraph GΘ = G[V Θ]. A network detector of the subgraph
GΘ is a collection of binary hypothesis tests to decide which
of the graph’s vertices belong to the foreground vertices V Θ.
Formally, a network detector is an element of the vertex space
of G:
Definition 2 Let G = (V,E) be a graph. A network detec-
tor φ on G is a {0, 1}-valued function φ ∈ V (G). The induced
subgraph Gφ = G[V φ] of V φ = { v : φv = 1 } is called the
foreground network and the induced subgraph Gφ˜ = G[V φ˜]
of V φ˜ = { v : φv = 0 } is called the background network, in
which φ˜ denotes the logical complement of φ.
The correlation between a network detector φ and the
actual threat network defined by the function Θ determines
the detection performance of φ, measured using the detector’s
probability of detection (PD) and probability of false alarm
(PFA). The PD and PFA of φ are the fraction of correct and
incorrect foreground vertices determined by φ:
PDφ = #(V φ ∩ V Θ)/#V Θ, (5)
PFAφ = #(V φ ∩ V Θ˜)/#V Θ˜. (6)
Observation models are now introduced and applied in the
sequel to threat propagation models in the contexts of spatial-
only graphs, space-time graphs whose edges have time stamps,
and finally a hybrid graphs with edges of mixed type. Assume
that there are C observed vertices { vb1 , . . . , vbC } ⊂ V at
which observations are taken. In the resulting Laplacian prob-
lem, these are “boundary” vertices, and the rest are “interior.”
The simplest case involves scalar measurements; however,
there is a straightforward extension to multidimensional ob-
servations.
Definition 3 Let G = (V,E) be a graph. An observation on
the graph is a vector z : { vb1 , . . . , vbC } → M ⊂ RC from
C vertices to a measurement space M ⊂ RC .
Ideally, observation of a foreground and/or background
vertices unequivocally determines whether the observed ver-
tices lie in the foreground or background networks, i.e. given
a foreground graph GΘ = G[V Θ] and a foreground vertex
v ∈ V Θ, an observation vector z evaluated at v would yield
z(v) = 1, and z evaluated at a background vertex v′ ∈ V Θ˜
would yield z(v′) = 0. In general, it is assumed that the
observation z(v) at v and the threat Θv at v are not statistically
independent, i.e. f
(
z(v) | Θv
) 6= f(z(v)) for probability
density f , so that there is positive mutual information between
z(v) and Θv . Bayes’ rule for determining how likely a vertex
is to be a foreground member or not depends on the model
linking observations to threat:
Definition 4 Let GΘ = G[V Θ] be the foreground graph
of a graph G determined by Θ ∈ V (G), and let
z : { vb1 , . . . , vbC } →M ⊂ RC be an observation on G. The
conditional probability density f
(
z(v) | Θv
)
is called the
observation model of vertex v ∈ V .
The simplest, ideal observation model equates threat with
observation so that fideal
(
z(v) | Θv
)
= δz(v)Θv in which δij
is the Kronecker delta. Though the threat network hypotheses
are being treated here independently at each vertex, this
framework allows for more sophisticated global models that
include hypotheses over two or more vertices.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the development
of Bayesian methods of using measurements on a graph to
determine the probability of threat on a graph in various
contexts—spatial-only, space-timed, and the hybrid case—then
showing that these methods are optimum in the Neyman–
Pearson sense of maximizing the probability of detection at
a given false alarm rate. The motivating problem is:
Problem 1 Detect the foreground graph GΘ = G[V Θ] in the
graph G = (V,E) with an unknown foreground Θ ∈ V (G)
and known observation vector z(vb1 , . . . , vbC ).
This problem is addressed by computing the probability of
threat P (Θv) at all graph vertices from the measurements
at observed vertices using an observation model and the
application of Bayes’ rule.
A. Spatial Threat Propagation
A spatial threat propagation algorithm is motivated and
developed now, which will be used in the subsequent space-
time generalization, and will demonstrate the connection to
spectral network detection methods. A vertex is declared to
be threatening if the observed threat propagates to that vertex.
We wish to compute the probability of threat P (Θv = 1 | z) at
all vertices v ∈ V in a graph G = (V,E) given an observation
z(vb1 , . . . , vbC ) on G. Implicit in Problem 1 is a coordinated
threat network in which threat propagates via network connec-
tions, i.e. graph edges. For simplicity, probabilities conditioned
on the observation z will be written
θv = P (Θv | z) (7)
with an implied dependence on the observation vector z and
the event Θv = 1 expressed as Θv .
To model the diffusion of threat throughout the graph, we
introduce an a priori probability ψv at each vertex v that
represents threat diffusion at v. ψv is the probability that threat
propagates through vertex v to its neighbors, otherwise threat
propagates to an absorbing “non-threat” state with probability
1− ψv . A threat diffusion event at v is represented by the
{0, 1}-valued r.v. Ψv:
5328 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SIGNAL PROCESSING, VOL. 62, NO. 20, 2014
Definition 5 The threat diffusion model of a graph
G = (V,E) with observation z is given by the a priori
{0, 1}-valued event Ψv that threat Θv propagates through v
with probability ψv .
Threat propagation on the graph from the observed vertices
to all other vertices is defined as an average over all random
walks between vertices and the observations. A single random
walk between v and an observed vertex vbc is defined by the
sequence
walkv→vbc = (vw1 , vw2 , . . . , vwL) (8)
with endpoints vw1 = v and vwL = vbc , comprised of L steps
along vertices vwl ∈ V . The probabilities for each step of the
random walk are defined by the elements of the transition
matrix tvu from vertex v to u, multiplied by the a priori prob-
ability ψv that threat propagates through v. The assumption
that G is strongly connected guarantees the existence of a
walk between every vertex and every observation. Threat may
be absorbed to the non-threat state with probability 1− ψvwl
at each step. The simplest models for both the transition
and a priori probabilities are uniform: tij = 1/ degree(vi) for
(i, j) ∈ E, i.e. T = D−1A, and ψv ≡ 1. The implications of
these simple models as well as more general weighted models
will be explored throughout this section.
The indicator function
Iwalkv→vbc
=
∏L
l=1
Ψ(l)vwl
(9)
determines whether threat propagates along the walk or is
absorbed into the non-threat state (the superscript ‘(l)’ allows
for the possibility of repeated vertices in the sequence). The
definition of threat propagation is captured in three parts:
(1) a single random walk, walkv→vbc , with Iwalkv→vbc = 1
yields threat probability θvbc at v; (2) the probability of threat
averaged over all such random walks; (3) the random variable
obtained by averaging the r.v. Θvbc over all such random
walks. Formally,
Definition 6 (Threat Propagation). Let G = (V,E) be a
strongly connected graph with threat probabilities θvb1 , . . . ,
θvbC at observed vertices vb1 , . . . , vbC and the threat diffusion
model ψv for all v ∈ V . (1) For a random walk on G from v
to observed vertex vbc with transition matrix T, walkv→vbc =
(vw1 , vw2 , . . . , vwL), if events Ψvwl ≡ 1 for all vertices vwl
along the walk, then the threat propagation from vbc to v
along walkv→vbc is defined to be θvbc ; otherwise, the threat
equals zero. (2) Threat propagation to vertex v is defined as
the expectation of threat propagation to v along all random
walks emanating from v,
θv = lim
K→∞
1
K
∑
k
I
walk
(k)
v→vbc(k)
θvbc(k) , (10)
where the kth walk terminates at the observed vertex vbc(k) .
(3) Random threat propagation to vertex v is defined as the
random variable
Θ¯v = lim
K→∞
1
K
∑
k
I
walk
(k)
v→vbc(k)
Θ(k)vbc(k)
(11)
v
Single hop walk
P(Θv | z) = P(v→vb)P(Θvb)
  = ψvP(Θvb)
vb
z
v
Multiple hop walk
vb
z
1
2
v
Random walk
Θv = lim K –1�k Iv→vb(k)Θvb(k)
 → P(Θv | z) = P(v→vb)P(Θvb)
vb
z
1
2
3 4ψ3
ψ1
ψ2
ψ4
ψv
ψ1
ψ2
ψv
ψv
P(Θv | z) = P(v→vb)P(Θvb)
  = ψ1ψ2ψvP(Θvb)
a.s.
Fig. 1. Illustration of the random walk representation for threat propagation
from Definition 6 and Eqs. (11) and (33), for the case of a single observation.
The upper illustration shows the simplest, trivial case with a single hop from
the observation to the vertex. The middle illustration shows the next simplest
case with multiple hops. The lower illustration shows an example of the
general case, comprised of the simpler multiple hop case.
with independent draws Θ(k)vbc(k) of the observed threat.
Fig. 1 illustrates threat propagation of Definition 6 and
Eq. (11) [and Eq. (33) from the sequel] for the simple-to-
general cases of a single hop, multiple hops, and an arbitrary
random walk. By the law of large numbers,
Θ¯v
a.s.→ θv as K →∞. (12)
The random walk model is described using the distinct
yet equivalent probabilistic and stochastic realization repre-
sentations. The probabilistic representation describes the threat
probabilities by a Laplacian system of linear equations, which
amounts to equating threat at a vertex to an average of
neighboring probabilities. In contrast, the stochastic realization
representation presented below in Section III-A2 describes the
evolution of a single random walk realization whose ensemble
statistics are described by the probabilistic representation,
presented next.
1) Probabilistic Approach: Consider the (unobserved)
vertex v 6∈ { vb1 , . . . , vbC } with neighbors N(v) =
{ vn1 , . . . , vndv } ⊂ V and dv = degree(v). The probabilistic
equation for threat propagation from the neighbors of a ver-
tex v follows immediately from Definition 6 from first-step
analysis, yielding the threat propagation equation:
θv = ψv
∑
u∈N(v) tvuθu, (13)
which is simply the average of the neighboring threat proba-
bilities weighted by transition probabilities tvu = (T)vu. Note
that because Aθ ≥ θ, θv is a subharmonic function on the
graph [19], [28]. In the simplest case of uniform transition
probabilities, T = D−1A and
θv =
ψv
dv
∑
u∈N(v) θu. (14)
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Expressed in matrix-vector notation, Eqs. (13) and (14) be-
come
θ = ΨTθ and θ = ΨD−1Aθ, (15)
where (θ)v = θv , Ψ = Diag(ψv) is the diagonal matrix of
a priori threat diffusion probabilities, T, D, and A are,
respectively, the transition, degree, and adjacency matrices.
The threat probabilities at the observed vertices vb1 , . . . , vbC
are determined by the observation model of Definition 4,
and threat probabilities at all other vertices are determined
by solving Eq. (15), as with all Laplacian boundary value
problems.
As seen in the spectral network detection methods in
Section II-B, many network detection algorithms exploit prop-
erties of the graph Laplacian, and therefore must address
the fundamental challenge posed by the implication of the
maximum principle that harmonic functions are constant [19]
in many important situations [Eq. (4)], and because the con-
stant function does not distinguish between vertices, detection
algorithms that rely only on solutions to Laplace’s equation
provide a futile approach to detection. If the boundary is
constant, i.e. the probability of threat on all observed vertices
is equal, then this is the probability of threat on every vertex
in the graph. The later example is relevant in the practical case
in which there a single observation. The maximum principle
applies directly to threat propagation with uniform prior Ψ = I
and uniform probability of threat po on the observed vertices:
Eqs. (15) are recognized as Laplace’s equation, (I−T)θ = 0
or (I−D−1A)θ = 0, whose solution is trivially θ = po1.
Equivalently, from the stochastic realization point-of-view, the
probability of threat on all vertices is the same because average
over all random walks between any vertex to a boundary
(observed) vertex is trivially the observed, constant probability
of threat po.
The following maximum principle establishes the existence
of a unique non-negative threat probability on a graph given
threat probabilities at observed vertices:
Theorem 1 (Maximum Principle for Threat Propagation).
Let G = (V,E) be a connected graph with positive probability
of threat θvb1 , . . . , θvbC at observed vertices vb1 , . . . , vbC
and the a priori probability ψv that threat propagates through
vertex v. Then there exists a unique probability of threat θv at
all vertices such that θv ≥ 0 and the maximum threat occurs
at the observed vertices.
Proof: That θv exists follows from the connectivity of G, and
that it takes its maximum on the boundary follows immediately
from Eq. (14) because the threat at all vertices is necessarily
bounded above by their neighbors. Now prove that θv is
nonnegative by establishing a contradiction. Let θm be the
minimum of all θv < 0. Because ψm ≤ 1, Eq. (14) implies
that θm ≥ Avg[N(m)], the weighted average value of the
neighbors of m. Therefore, there exists a neighbor n ∈ N(m)
such that θn ≤ θm. But θm is by assumption the minimum
value. Therefore, θn = θm for all n ∈ N(m). Because G is
connected, θv ≡ θm is constant for all unobserved vertices
on G. Now consider the minimum threat θi for which i ∈ N(b)
is a neighbor of an observed vertex b. By Eq. (14),
θi = ψid
−1
i
(∑
j∈N(i)\b θj + θb
)
, (16)
≥ ψid−1i
(
(di − 1)θi + θb
)
. (17)
Therefore,
θi ≥ ψiθb
(1− ψi)di + ψi ≥ 0, (18)
a contradiction. Therefore, the minimum value of θv is non-
negative.
This theorem is intuitively appealing because it shows
how nonuniform a priori probabilities ψv yield a nonconstant
and nonnegative threat on the graph; however, the theorem
conceals the crucial additional “absorbing” state that allows
threat to dissipate away from the constant solution. This slight
defect will be corrected shortly when the equivalent stochastic
realization Markov chain model is introduced. Models about
the likelihood of threat at specific vertices across the graph are
provided by the a priori probabilities ψv , which as discussed
above prevent the uninformative (yet valid) solution of con-
stant threat across the graph given an observation of threat at
a specific vertex.
A simple model for the a priori probabilities is degree-
weighted threat propagation (DWTP),
ψv =
1
dv
(DWTP), (19)
in which threat is less likely to propagate through high-degree
vertices. Another simple model sets the mean propagation
length proportional to the graph’s average path length l(G)
yields length-weighted threat propagation (LWTP)
ψv ≡ 2−1/ l(G) (LWTP). (20)
For almost-surely connected Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graphs with
p = n−1 log n, l(G) = (log n− γ)/ log log n + 1/2 and
γ = 0.5772 . . . is Euler’s constant [25]. A model akin to
breadth-first search (BFS) sets the a priori probabilities to be
inversely proportional to the Dijkstra distance from observed
vertices, i.e.
ψv ∝ 1/ dist(v, { vb1 , . . . , vbC }) (BFS). (21)
Defining the generalized Laplacian operator
Łψ def= I−ΨD−1A, (22)
the threat propagation equation Eq. (15) written as
Łψθ = 0, (23)
connects the generalized asymmetric Laplacian matrix of with
threat propagation, the solution of which itself may be viewed
as a boundary value problem with the harmonic operator Łψ .
Given observations at vertices vb1 , . . . , vbC , the harmonic
threat propagation equation is(
Łψii Ł
ψ
ib
)(
θi
θb
)
= 0 (24)
where the generalized Laplacian Łψ =
(Łψii
Łψbi
Łψib
Łψbb
)
and the
threat vector θ =
(
θi
θb
)
have been permuted so that observed
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vertices are in the ‘b’ blocks (the “boundary”), unobserved
vertices are in ‘i’ blocks (the “interior”), and the observation
vector θb is given. The harmonic threat is the solution to
Eq. (24),
θi = −(Łψii )−1(Łψibθb). (25)
Eq. (24) is directly analogous to Laplace’s equation ∆ϕ = 0
given a fixed boundary condition. As discussed in the next
subsection and Section II-B, the connection between threat
propagation and harmonic graph analysis also provides a link
to spectral-based methods for network detection. In practice,
the highly sparse linear system of Eq. (25) may be solved by
simple repeated iteration of Eq. (13), or using the biconjugate
gradient method, which provides a practical computational
approach that scales well to graphs with thousands of vertices
and thousands of time samples in the case of space-time threat
propagation, resulting in graphs of order ten million or more.
In practice, significantly smaller subgraphs are encountered in
applications such as threat network discovery [56], for which
linear solvers with sparse systems are extremely fast.
2) Stochastic Realization Approach: The stochastic realiza-
tion interpretation of the Bayesian threat propagation equations
(13) is that the probability of threat for one random walk
from v to the observed vertex vbc is
θv | walkv→vbc = θvbc , (26)
and the probability of threat θv at v equals the threat proba-
bility averaged over all random walks emanating from v. This
is equivalent to an absorbing Markov chain with absorbing
states [49] at which random walks terminate. The absorbing
vertices for the threat diffusion model are the C observed
vertices, and an augmented state reachable by all unobserved
vertices representing a transition from threat to non-threat with
probability 1− ψv . The (N + 1)-by-(N + 1) transition matrix
for the Markov chain corresponding to threat propagation
equals
T =

N−C C 1
N−C G H 1−ψN−C
C 0 I 0
1 0 0 1
 (27)
in which G and H are defined by the block partition
ΨD−1A =
(N−C C
N−C G H
C ∗ ∗
)
(28)
with ‘∗’ denoting unused blocks, and ψN−C =
(ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψN−C)T is the vector of a priori threat
diffusion probabilities from 1 to N − C. The observed
vertices vb1 , . . . , vbC are assigned to indices N − C + 1, . . . ,
N , and the augmented “non-threat” state is assigned to
index N + 1.
According to this stochastic realization model, the threat
at a vertex for any single random walk that terminates at an
absorbing vertex is given by the threat level at the terminal
vertex, with the augmented “non-threat” vertex assigned a
threat level of zero; the threat is determined by this result
averaged over all random walks. Ignoring the a priori proba-
bilities, this is also precisely the stochastic realization model
for equilibrium thermodynamics and, in general, solutions to
Laplace’s equation [47], [51].
As in Eq. (4), the uniform vector (N+1)−11N+1 is the left
eigenvector of T because T is a right stochastic matrix, i.e.
T·1 = 1. For an irreducible transition matrix of a strongly
connected graph, the Perron–Frobenius theorem [26], [28]
guarantees that this eigenvalue is simple and that the con-
stant vector is the unique invariant eigenvector corresponding
to λ = 1, a trivial solution that, as usual, poses a fundamental
problem for network detection. However, neither version of the
Perron–Frobenius theorem applies to the transition matrix T of
an absorbing Markov chain because T is not strictly positive,
as required by Perron, nor is T irreducible, as required by
Frobenius—the absorbing states are not strongly connected to
the graph.
To guarantee the existence of nonnegative threat propagating
over the graph, we require a generalization of the Perron–
Frobenius theorem for reducible nonnegative matrices of the
form found in Eq. (27). The following theorem introduces a
new version of Perron–Frobenius that establishes the existence
of a nonnegative basis for the principal invariant subspace of
a reducible nonnegative matrix.
Theorem 2 (Perron–Frobenius for a Reducible Nonnega-
tive Matrix). Let T be a reducible, nonnegative, order n
matrix of canonical form,
T =
(
Q R
0 Ir
)
, (29)
such that the maximum modulus of the eigenvalues of Q is
less than unity, |λmax(Q)| < 1, and rank R = r. Then the
maximal eigenvalue of T is unity with multiplicity r and
nondefective. Furthermore, there exists a nonnegative matrix
E =
(
(I−Q)−1R
Ir
)
(30)
of rank r such that
TE = E, (31)
i.e. the columns of E span the principal invariant subspace
of T.
The proof follows immediately by construction and a
straightforward computation involving the partition E =
(
E1
E2
)
with the choice E2 = Ir, resulting in the nonnegative solution
to Eq. (31), E1 = (I−Q)−1R = (I + Q + Q2 + · · · )R.
Theorem 2 has immediate application to threat propagation,
for by definition the probability of threat on the graph is
determined by the vector θa =
(
θi
θab
)
such that Tθa = θa
and θab =
(
θb
0
)
is determined by the probabilities of threat
θb = (θN−C+1, . . . , θN )T at observed vertices vb1 , . . . ,
vbC [cf. Eq. (24)] augmented with zero threat θ
a
N+1 = 0 at
the “non-threat” vertex. From Eqs. (27) and (29), Q = G,
R =
(
H 1 − ψN−C
)
, and Rθab = Hθb. Therefore, the
vector that satisfies the proscribed boundary value problem
equals
θa =
(
(I−G)−1Hθb
θab
)
. (32)
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As is well-known [49], the hitting probabilities of a random
walk from an unobserved vertex to an observed vertex are
given by the matrix U = (I−G)−1H; therefore, an equiv-
alent definition of threat probability θv from Eq. (32) is the
probability that a random walk emanating from v terminates
at an observed vertex, conditioned on the probability of threat
over all observed vertices:
θv =
∑
c
P (walkv→vbc )P (Θvbc ). (33)
We have thus proved the following theorem establishing the
equivalence between the probabilistic and stochastic realiza-
tion approaches of threat propagation.
Theorem 3 (Harmonic threat propagation). The vec-
tor θ =
(
θi
θb
)
∈ RN is a solution to the boundary value
problem of Eq. (24) if and only if the augmented vector
θa =
(
θi
θab
)
∈ RN+1 is a stationary vector of the absorbing
Markov chain transition matrix T of Eq. (27) with given
values θab. Furthermore, θ is nonnegative.
This theorem will also provide a connection to the spectral
method for network detection discussed in Section II-B.
B. Space-Time Threat Propagation
Many important network detection applications, especially
networks based on vehicle tracks and computer communi-
cation networks, involve directed graphs in which the edges
have departure and arrival times associated with their initial
and terminal vertices. Space-Time threat propagation is used
compute the time-varying threat across a graph given one or
more observations at specific vertices and times [48], [57]. In
such scenarios, the time-stamped graph G = (V,E) may be
viewed as a space-time graph GT = (V × T,ET ) where T is
the set of sample times and ET ⊂ [V × T ]2 is an edge set
determined by the temporal correlations between vertices at
specific times. This edge set is application-dependent, but must
satisfy the two constraints, (1) if
(
u(tk), v(tl)
) ∈ ET then
(u, v) ∈ E, and (2) temporal subgraphs ((u, v), ET (u, v))
between any two vertices u and v are defined by a tem-
poral model ET (u, v) ⊂ [T unionsq T ]2. If the stronger, con-
verse of property (1) holds, i.e. if (u, v) ∈ E then either(
u(tk), v(tl)
) ∈ ET or (v(tl), u(tk)) ∈ ET for all tk, tl, then
if the graph G is irreducible, then so is the space-time graph
GT . An example space-time graph is illustrated in Fig. 2.
The general models for spatial threat propagation provided
in the preceding subsection will now be augmented to include
dynamic models of threat propagation.
Given an observed threat at a particular vertex and time, we
wish to compute the inferred threat across all vertices and all
times. Given a vertex v, denote the threat at v and at time t ∈ R
by the {0, 1}-valued stochastic process Θv(t), with value zero
indicating no threat, and value unity indicating a threat. As
above, denote the probability of threat at v at t by
θv(t)
def
= P
(
Θv(t) = 1
)
= P
(
Θv(t)
)
. (34)
The threat state at v is modeled by a finite-state continuous
time Markov jump process between from state 1 to state 0
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Fig. 2. A directed space-time graph GT with vertices V × T , V = {u, v }
sampled at index times T = (t1, . . . , t6). For example, an interaction between
u(t5) and v(t3) (represented by the doubled-sided arrow v(t3)←→ u(t5)
above) also creates space-time edges via the space-time kernel [Eq. (36)]
between u(t5) and other times at v, and v(t3) and other times at u.
with Poisson rate λv . With this simple model the threat
stochastic process Θv(t) satisfies the Itoˆ stochastic differential
equation [60],
dΘv = −Θv dNv; Θv(0) = θ1, (35)
where Nv(t) is a Poisson process with rate λv defined for
positive time, and simple time-reversal provides the model for
negative times. Given an observed threat z = Θv(0) = 1 at v
at t = 0 so that θV (0) = 1, the probability of threat at v under
the Poisson process model (including time-reversal) is
θv(t) = P
(
Θv(t) | z = Θv(0) = 1
)
= e−λv|t|, (36)
This stochastic model provides a Bayesian framework for
inferring, or propagating, threat at a vertex over time given
threat at a specific time. The function
Kv(t) = e
−λv|t| (37)
of Eq. (36) is called the space-time threat kernel and when
combined with spatial propagation provides a temporal model
ET for a space-time graph. A Bayesian model for propagating
threat from vertex to vertex will provide a full space-time
threat diffusion model and allow for the application of the
optimum maximum likelihood test that will be developed in
Section III-D.
Propagation of threat from vertex to vertex is determined by
interactions between vertices. Upon computation of the space-
time adjacency matrix, the spatial analysis of Section III-A
applies directly to space-time graphs whose vertices are space-
time positions. The threat at vertex v at which a single
interaction τ from vertex u arrives and/or departs at times
tvτ and t
u
τ is determined by Eq. (36) and the (independent)
event Ψv(t) that threat propagates through v at time t:
P
(
Θv(t)
)
= θv(t) = θu(t
u
τ )Kv(t− tvτ )ψv(t). There is a linear
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transformation
θv(t) = ψv(t)K(t− tvτ )θu(tuτ )
=
∫ ∞
−∞
ψv(t)K(t− tvτ )δ(σ − tuτ )θu(σ) dσ (38)
from the threat probability at u to v. Discretizing time, the
temporal matrix Kuvτ for the discretized operator has the sparse
form
Kuvτ =
(
0 . . . 0K(tk − tvτ ) 0 . . . 0
)
, (39)
where 0 represents an all-zero column, tk represents a vector
of discretized time, and the discretized function K(tk − tvτ )
appears in the column corresponding to the discretized time
at tuτ . Threat propagating from vertex v to u along the same
interaction τ is given by the comparable expression θu(t) =
θv(t
v
τ )K(t− tuτ ), whose discretized linear operator Kvuτ takes
the form
Kvuτ =
(
0 . . . 0K(tk − tuτ ) 0 . . . 0
)
(40)
[cf. Eq. (39)] where the nonzero column corresponds to tvτ .
The sparsity of Kuvτ and K
vu
τ will be essential for practical
space-time threat propagation algorithms. The collection of
all interactions determines a weighted space-time adjacency
matrix A for the space-time graph GT . This is a matrix of
order #V ·#T whose temporal blocks for interactions between
vertices u and v equals,(
Auu Auv
Avu Avv
)
=
(
0
∑
l K
vu
τl∑
l K
uv
τl
0
)
. (41)
Note that with the space-time threat kernel of Eq. (37), if G
is irreducible, then so is GT .
As with spatial-only threat propagation of Eq. (13), the
space-time threat propagation equation is
θ = ΨW−1Aθ (42)
or θv(tk) =
ψv(tk)∑
u,l kvu;kl
∑
u,l
kvu;klθu(tl) (43)
in which θ is the (discretized) space-time vector of
threat probabilities, A = (kvu;kl) is the (weighted) space-
time adjacency matrix, and W = Diag(A·1) and Ψ =
diag
(
ψ1(t1), . . . , ψN (t#T )
)
are, respectively, the space-time
diagonal matrices of the space-time vertex weights and a priori
probabilities that threat propagates through each spatial vertex
at a specific time. In contrast to the treatment of spatial-only
threat propagation in Section III-A, the space-time graph is
necessarily a directed graph, consistent with the asymmetric
space-time adjacency matrix of Eq. (41).
By assumption, the graph G is irreducible, implying that
the space-time graph GT is also irreducible. Therefore, The-
orem 1 implies a well-defined solution to the space-time
threat propagation equation of Eq. (42) for a set observations
at specific vertices and times, vb1(tb1), . . . , vbC (tbC ). Yet
the Perron–Frobenius theorem for the space-time Laplacian
Ł = I−W−1A poses precisely the same detection challenge
as with spatial-only propagation: if the a priori probabilities
are constant and equal to unity, i.e. Ψ = I, and the observed
probability of threat is constant, then the space-time proba-
bility of threat is also constant for all spatial vertices and all
times, yielding a hopeless detection method.
However, the advantage of time-stamped edges is that the
times can be used to detected temporally coordinated network
activity—we seek to detect vertices whose activity is corre-
lated with that of threat observed at other vertices. According
to this model of threat networks, the a priori probability that
a threat propagates through vertex v at time tk is determined
by the Poisson process used to model the probability of threat
as a function of time:
ψv(tk) =
1
dv
∑
u,l
kvu;kl, (44)
where dv is the spatial degree of vertex v, i.e. the number of
interactions associated with a spatial vertex. If all interactions
arrive/depart at the same time at v, then the a priori probability
of threat diffusion is unity at this time, but different times
reduce this probability according to the stochastic process
for threat. Thus space-time threat propagation for coordinated
activity is determined by the threat propagation equation,
θ = D−1Aθ (45)
in which D = diag
(
d1I, . . . , dNI
)
is the block-diagonal
space-time matrix of (unweighted) spatial degrees and A is the
weighted space-time adjacency matrix as in Eq. (42). This al-
gorithm may also be further generalized to account for spatial-
only a priori probability models such as the distance from ob-
served vertices by replacing 1/dv in Eq. (45) with ψ′v/dv and
an a priori model as in Eq. (19), yielding the threat propagation
equation θ = Ψ′D−1Aθ with Ψ′ = diag
(
ψ′1I, . . . , ψ
′
NI
)
.
C. Hybrid Threat Propagation
The temporal kernels introduced for time-stamped edges
in Section III-B are appropriate for network detection appli-
cations that involve time-stamped edges; however, there are
many applications in which such time-stamped information
is either unavailable, irrelevant, or uncertain. Ignoring small
routing delays, computer network communication protocols
occur essentially instantaneously, and text documents may
describe relationships between sites independent of a spe-
cific timeframe. Integrating spatio-temporal relationships from
multiple information sources necessitates a hybrid approach
combining, where appropriate, the spatial-only capabilities of
Section III-A with the space-time methods of Section III-B.
In situations such as computer communication networks in
which the timescale of the relationship is much smaller than
the discretized timescale, then connections from one vertex to
another arrive at the same discretized time, and the temporal
blocks for connections between vertices u and v replaces
Eq. (41) and equals,(
Auu Auv
Avu Avv
)
=
(
0 I
I 0
)
. (46)
In situations such as time-independent references within text
documents in which threat at any time at vertex u implies a
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threat at all times at vertex v, and vice versa, the temporal
blocks for connections between vertices u and v equals,(
Auu Auv
Avu Avv
)
=
(
0 (#T )−111T
(#T )−111T 0
)
, (47)
i.e. a space-time clique between u and v. This equivalent the
space-time model with Poisson rate λ = 0.
D. Neyman–Pearson Network Detection
Network detection of a subgraph within a graph G = (V,E)
of order N is treated as N independent binary hypothesis
tests to decide which of the graph’s N vertices do not
belong (null hypothesis H0) or belong (hypothesis H1) to the
network. Maximizing the probability of detection (PD) for a
fixed probability of false alarm (PFA) yields the Neyman–
Pearson test involving the log-likelihood ratio of the competing
hypotheses. We will derive this test in the context of network
detection, which both illustrates the assumptions that ensure
detection optimality, as well as indicates practical methods
for computing the log-likelihood ratio test and achieving an
optimal network detection algorithm. It will be seen that a
few basic assumptions yield an optimum test that is equivalent
to the Bayesian threat propagation algorithm developed in the
previous section. If any part of the graph is unknown or uncer-
tain, then the Markov transition probabilities may be treated as
random variables and either marginalized out of the likelihood
ratio, yielding Neyman–Pearson optimality in the average
sense, or the maximum likelihood estimate may be used in
the suboptimum generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) [63].
We will not cover extensions to unknown parameters in this
paper. The optimum test involves the graph Laplacian, which
allows comparison of Neyman–Pearson testing to several other
network detection methods whose algorithms are also related
to the properties of the Laplacian.
An optimum hypothesis test is now derived for the presence
of a network given a set of observations z according to the
observation model of Definition 4. Optimality is defined in the
Neyman–Pearson sense in which the probability of detection
is maximized at a constant false alarm rate (CFAR) [63].
For the general problem of network detection of a subgraph
within graph G of order N , the decision of which of the
2N hypothesis Θ = (Θv1 , . . . ,ΘvN )
T to choose involves a
2N -ary multiple hypothesis test over the measurement space
of the observation vector z, and an optimal test involves
partitioning the measurement space into 2N regions yielding a
maximum PD. This NP-hard general combinatoric problem is
clearly computationally and analytically intractable. However,
Eq. (11) following Definition 6 guarantees that the threats at
each vertex are independent random variables, allowing the
general 2N -ary multiple hypothesis test to be greatly simplified
by treating it as N independent binary hypothesis tests at each
vertex.
At each vertex v ∈ G and unknown threat Θ: V → {0, 1}
across the graph , consider the binary hypothesis test for the
unknown value Θv ,
H0(v): Θv = 0 (vertex belongs to background)
H1(v): Θv = 1 (vertex belongs to foreground).
(48)
Given the observation vector z : {vb1 , . . . , vbC} ⊂ V →M ⊂
RC with observation models f
(
z(vbj ) | Θvbj
)
, j = 1, . . . ,
C, the PD and PFA are given by the integrals PD =
∫
R
f(z |
Θv = 1) dz and PFA =
∫
R
f(z | Θv = 0) dz, where R ⊂M is
the detection region in which observations are declared to yield
the decision Θv = 1, otherwise Θv is declared to equal 0. The
optimum Neyman–Pearson test uses the detection region R
that maximizes PD at a fixed CFAR value PFA0, yielding the
likelihood ratio (LR) test [63],
f(z | Θv = 1)
f(z | Θv = 0)
H1(v)
≷
H0(v)
λ (49)
for some λ > 0. Likelihood ratio tests are also used for graph
classification [36].
Finally, a simple application of Bayes’ theorem to the har-
monic threat θv = f(Θv | z) provides the optimum Neyman–
Pearson detector [Eq. (49)] because
f(z | Θv = 1)
f(z | Θv = 0) =
f(Θv = 1 | z)
f(Θv = 0 | z) ·
f(Θv = 0)
f(Θv = 1)
=
θv
1− θv ·
f(Θv = 1)
f(Θv = 0)
H1(v)
≷
H0(v)
λ, (50)
results in a threshold of the harmonic space-time threat prop-
agation vector of Eq. (7),
θv
H1(v)
≷
H0(v)
threshold, (51)
with the prior ratio f(Θv = 1)/f(Θv = 0) and the monotonic
function θv 7→ θv/(1− θv) being absorbed into the detection
threshold. By construction, the event Θv = 1 is equivalent to
a random walk between v and one of the observed vertices
vb1 , . . . , vbC , along with one of the events Θvb1 = 1, . . . ,
ΘvbC = 1, as represented in Eq. (33). Note that θv and equiv-
alently the likelihood ratio are continuous functions of the
probabilities P (walkv→vbc ) and P (Θvbc ); therefore, equality
of the likelihood ratio to any given threshold exists only on
a set of measure zero. If the prior ratio is constant for all
vertices, then the threshold is also constant, and the likelihood
ratio test [Eq. (51)] for optimum network detection becomes
θ
H1
≷
H0
threshold. (52)
This establishes the detection optimality of harmonic space-
time threat propagation.
Because the probability of detecting threat is maximized
at each vertex, the probability of detection for the entire
subgraph is also maximized, yielding an optimum Neyman–
Pearson test under the simplification of treating the 2N -ary
multiple hypothesis testing problem as a sequence of N binary
hypothesis tests. Summarizing, the probability of network
detection given an observation z is maximized by computing
f(Θv | z) using a Bayesian threat propagation method and
applying a simple likelihood ratio test, yielding the following
theorem that equates threat propagation with the optimum
Neyman–Pearson test.
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Theorem 4 (Neyman–Pearson Optimality of Threat Prop-
agation). The solution to Bayesian threat propagation ex-
pressed in Eqs. (24) or (32) yields an optimum likelihood ratio
test in the Neyman–Pearson sense.
IV. MODELING AND PERFORMANCE
Evaluation of network detection algorithms may be ap-
proached from the perspectives of theoretical analysis or
empirical experimentation. Theoretical performance bounds
have only been accomplished for simple network models, i.e.
cliques [23], [33], [42] or dense subgraphs [5] embedded
within Erdo˝s–Re´nyi backgrounds, and there are no theoretical
results at all for more complex network models that char-
acterize real-world networks [58]. If representative network
data with truth is available, one may evaluate algorithm
performance with specific data sets [71]. However, real-world
data sets of covert networks with truth is unknown to the
authors. Therefore, network detection performance evaluation
must be conducted on simulated networks using generative
models. We begin with a simple stochastic blockmodel [65],
explore this model’s limitations, then introduce a new network
model designed to address these defects while at the same time
encompassing the characteristics of real-world networks [1],
[2], [12], [45], [70]. Varying model parameters also yields in-
sight on the dependence of algorithm performance on different
network characteristics.
For each evaluation, we compare performance between the
space-time threat propagation [STTP; Section III-B], breadth-
first search spatial-only threat propagation [BFS; Eq. (21)], and
modularity-based spectral detection algorithm [SPEC] [40].
The performance metric is the standard receiver operating
characteristic (ROC), which in the case of network detection
is the probability of detection (i.e. the percentage of true
foreground vertices detected) versus the probability of false
alarms (i.e. the percentage of background vertices detected)
as the detection threshold is varied.
A. Detection Performance On Stochastic Blockmodels
1) Stochastic Blockmodel Description: The stochastic
blockmodel captures the sparsity of real-world networks and
basic community structure [27] using a simple network frame-
work [65]. For a graph of order N divided into K com-
munities, the model is parameterized by a N -by-K {0, 1}
membership matrix Π and a K-by-K probability matrix S
that defines the probability of an edge between two ver-
tices based upon their community membership. Therefore,
the probability of an edge is determined by the off-diagonal
terms of the matrix ΠSΠT. By the classical result of Erdo˝s–
Re´nyi [20], each community is almost surely connected if
Skk > logNk/Nk in which Nk is the number of vertices
in community k. We introduce the activity parameter rk ≥ 1
and set Skk = rk logNk/Nk to adjust a community’s density
relative to its Erdo˝s–Re´nyi connectivity threshold.
2) Experimental Setup and Results: The objective of this
experiment is to quantify detection performance of a fore-
ground network with varying activity given observations from
a small fraction of its members. Fig. 3 illustrates the ROC
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Fig. 3. Detection ROC curves of the three different algorithms at two levels of
foreground activity, 1.1· logNfg/Nfg and 2· logNfg/Nfg. Data is simulated
using the stochastic blockmodel with 1000 Monte Carlo trials each with an
independent draw of the random network and single threat observation.
detection performance with a graph of order N = 256 and
K = 3 with two background communities of order 128, and
a foreground community of order 30 randomly embedded in
the background. The probability matrix is,
S =
0.08 0.02 0.020.02 0.08 0.02
0.02 0.02 rfg·0.1
 ,
parameterized by the activity rfg relative to the Erdo˝s–Re´nyi
foreground connectivity threshold log 30/30 ≈ 0.1. A simple
temporal model is used with all foreground interactions at
the same time (i.e. perfect coordination), and background
interactions uniformly distributed in time (i.e. uncoordinated).
Results are shown for both sparsely connected (rfg = 1.1)
and moderately connected (rfg = 2) foreground networks. The
simulations show that excellent ROC performance is achiev-
able if temporal information is exploited (STTP) with highly
coordinated foreground networks with sparse to moderate
connectivity. Because of the use of temporal information,
STTP outperforms BFS. Spectral methods, which are designed
to detect highly connected networks perform poorly on sparse
foreground networks, and improve as foreground network
connectivity increases, especially in the low PFA region in
which SPEC performs better than BFS threat propagation. This
result is consistent with expectations and recent theoretical
results for spectral methods applied to clique detection [5],
[42]. Continuous likelihood ratio tests possess ROC curves that
are necessarily convex upwards [63]; therefore, the ROCs for
threat propagation algorithms applied to data generated from
random walk propagation are necessarily convex. The results
of Fig. 3 show both threat propagation and spectral meth-
ods applied to data generated from a stochastic blockmodel.
Because the spectral detection algorithm is not associated
with a likelihood ratio test, convexity of its ROC curves is
not guaranteed—indeed, the spectral ROC curve with rfg = 2
is seen to be concave in the high PD region. All threat
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Fig. 4. Hybrid mixed-membership blockmodel for the network simulation
with N vertices, K communities, and L lifestyles. Shaded squares are model
parameters for tuning and circles are variables drawn during simulation.
propagation ROC curves are observed to be convex, except
for a small part of STTP with rfg = 1.1 near PD = 0.7. This
slight concavity (about 2%) may be caused by model mismatch
between the stochastic blockmodel and the random walk
model, or statistical fluctuation of the Monte Carlo analysis
(about 1.4% binomial distribution variance at PD = 0.7).
Of course, real-world networks are not perfectly coordi-
nated, ideal Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graphs. We will develop a novel,
more realistic model in the next section to explore how more
realistic networks with varying levels of foreground coordina-
tion affect the performance of space-time threat propagation.
B. Detection Performance on the Hybrid Mixed-Membership
Blockmodel
1) Hybrid Mixed-Membership Blockmodel Description:
Real-world networks display basic topological characteristics
that include a power-law degree distribution (i.e. the “small
world” property) [12], mixed-membership-based community
structure (i.e. individuals belong to multiple communities) [2],
[65], and sparsity [44]. No one simple network model captures
all these traits. For example, the stochastic blockmodel above
provides sparsity and a rough community structure, but does
not capture interactions through time, the power-law degree
distribution, nor the reality that each individual may belong
to multiple communities. The power-law models such as R-
MAT [12] do not capture membership-based community struc-
ture, and mixed-membership stochastic blockmodels [2] does
not capture power-law degree distribution nor temporal coor-
dination. To capture all these characteristics of the real-world
networks model, we propose a new parameterized generative
model called the “hybrid mixed-membership blockmodel”
(HMMB) that combines the features of these fundamental
network models. The proposed model is depicted as the plate
diagram in Fig. 4.
The hybrid mixed-membership blockmodel is an aggregate
of the following simpler models and their features: Erdo˝s–
Re´nyi for sparsity [20], Chung–Lu for power-law degree distri-
bution [1], and mixed-membership stochastic blockmodel for
community structure [2]. We model the number of interactions
between any two individuals (i.e. edge weights) as Poisson ran-
dom variables. Each interaction receives a timestamp through a
coordination model. As above, let N be the order of the graph,
and let K be the number of communities. Each individual (i.e.
vertex) divides its membership among the K communities (i.e.
mixed membership), and the fraction in which an individual
participates among the different communities is determined
by L distinct lifestyles. The rate λij of interactions between
vertices i and j is given by the product
λij = I
S
ij ·
λiλj∑
k λk
· zTi→jBzj→i, (53)
where the first term ISij is the (binary) indicator function drawn
from the stochastic blockmodel described in Section IV-A, the
second term λiλj/
(∑
k λk
)
is the Chung–Lu model with per-
vertex expected degrees λi, and the third term zTi→jBzj→i is
the mixed-membership stochastic blockmodel with K-by-K
block matrix B that determines the intercommunity interaction
strength, and zi→j is a {0, 1}-valued K-vector that indicates
which community membership that vertex i assumes when
interacting with vertex j.
The mixed-membership K-vector pii specifies the fraction
that individual vertex i divides its membership among the K
communities so that 1Tpii ≡ 1. Each vertex is assigned, via the
{0, 1}-valued L-vector li, to one of L “lifestyles” each with
an expected membership distribution given by the L-by-K
matrix X. The membership distribution pii is determined by a
Dirichlet random draw using the K-vector lTX. The lifestyle
vector li is determined from a multinomial random draw using
the L-vector φ as the probability of belonging to each lifestyle.
Similarly, for each interaction, the community indicator vector
zi→j is determined from a multinomial random draw using
the K-vector pii as the probability of belonging to each
community. The expected vertex degrees λi are determined
from a power-law random draw using the exponent α. The
parameter matrices S and B are fixed.
Finally, intracommunity coordination is achieved by the
nonnegative K-vector γ, a Poisson parameter of the average
number of coordinated events at each vertex within a specific
community. Smaller values of γk correspond to higher levels
of coordination in community k because there are fewer
event times from which to choose. A community-dependent
Poisson random draw determines the integer number of event
times within each community, which are then drawn uniformly
over the time extent of interest. An edge between vertices i
and j is assigned two random event timestamps based on the
community indicator vectors zi→j and zj→i.
2) Experimental Setup and Results: The objective of this
experiment is to quantify detection performance with varying
coordination of a realistic foreground network operating within
a realistic background. We use eleven “lifestyles” spanning ten
communities, with two lifestyles designated as foreground and
all others as background.
The foreground network’s coordination varies from γfg = 1
(i.e. highly coordinated activity at a single time, consistent
with the tactic used by covert networks to mitigate their
exposure to discovery) to γfg = 24 (i.e. less coordination).
Each member of the covert foreground network is also a mem-
ber of several background communities. The foreground and
background order are the same as in the experiment of Sec-
tion IV-A2, and sparsity levels all logNi/Ni. The foreground
network is only a small fraction of the entire population.
5336 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SIGNAL PROCESSING, VOL. 62, NO. 20, 2014
 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
PD
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
PFA
  STTP, γfg = 1
  STTP, γfg = 10
  STTP, γfg = 24
  BFS, γfg = 1
  SPEC, γfg = 11000 trials
Fig. 5. Detection ROC curves of the three different algorithms at three
levels (γfg = 1, 10, 24) of foreground coordination. Spectral detection and
BFS threat propagation do not use temporal information so their performance
is unaffected by the coordination level.
Foreground actors are characterized by two distinct lifestyles
representing their memberships in the covert community as
well as different background communities. The background
communities are intended to represent various business, home,
industry, religious, sports, or other social interactions.
Fig. 5 illustrates the ROC performance with these param-
eters, varying the level of foreground coordination. Through
Eq. (44), space-time threat propagation is designed to perform
well with highly coordinated networks, consistent with the
results observed in Fig. 5 in which STTP performs best at
the higher coordination levels and outperforms the breadth-
first search and modularity-based spectral detection methods.
The spectral detection algorithm is expected to perform poorly
in this scenario because, as discussed in Section II-B, it relies
upon a relatively dense foreground network, which does not
exist in this simulated dataset with realistic properties of covert
networks.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A Bayesian framework for network detection can be used to
unify the different approaches of network detection algorithms
based on random walks/diffusion and algorithms based on
spectral properties. Indeed, using the concise assumptions for
random walks and threat propagation laid out in Definition 6,
all the theoretical results follow immediately, including the
proof of equivalence, an exact, closed-form, efficient solution,
and Neyman–Pearson optimality. Not only is this theoretically
appealing, but it provides direct practical benefits through
a new network detection algorithm called space-time threat
propagation, that is shown to achieve superior performance
with simulated covert networks. Bayesian space-time threat
propagation is interpreted both as a random walk on a graph
and, equivalently, as the solution to a harmonic boundary value
problem. Bayes’ rule determines the unknown probability of
threat on the uncued nodes—the “interior”—based on threat
observations at cue nodes—the “boundary.” Hybrid threat
propagation algorithms appropriate for heterogeneous spatio-
temporal relationships can be obtained from this general threat
diffusion model. This new method is compared to well-known
spectral methods by examining competing notions of network
detection optimality. To model realistic covert networks real-
istically embedded within realistic backgrounds, a new hybrid
mixed-membership blockmodel based on mixed membership
of random graphs is introduced and used to assess algorithm
detection performance on graphs with varying activity and
coordination. In the important situations of low foreground
activity with varying levels of coordination, the examples show
the superior detection performance of Bayesian space-time
threat propagation compared to other spatial-only and uncued
spectral methods.
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